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Cooper v. McClure: The Difficulty of Proving
Antitrust Violations and the Need for a False
Claims Act
IN STATE EX REL. COOPER V MCCLuRE,' THE SUPERIOR COURT of North Carolina
considered whether a group of environmental consultants, by submitting inflated
billing information to the state government, participated in a conspiracy in re-
straint of trade and issued summary judgment against them.2 The court held that
there was no issue of material fact as to the defendants' guilt of conspiracy and
restraint of trade.' Although the defendants undoubtedly participated in collusive
and fraudulent acts, the court grounded its decision imposing liability in conspir-
acy and antitrust law.4 The court appears to have been disoriented by the multitude
of evidence presented by the plaintiffs, and failed to notice that material issues
existed about the basic elements of conspiracy and restraint of trade.5 In doing so,
the court neglected to consider whether there was any practical detriment to the
public, and left businesses without the protection of the rule of reason.6 However,
given the difficulty of proving actual harm, denying summary judgment would
probably have left the wrongdoers here without accountability, illustrating the need
for a false claims act in North Carolina to deter procurement fraud against the
government.7
I. THE CASE
As a means of regulating environmental cleanup services, the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly implemented a plan, that would allow the state to fund cleanup of
underground storage tanks.' Under this framework, "the North Carolina Depart-
ment of Environmental Natural Resources ("DENR") [would] reimburse tank own-
J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, May 2009; B.S., University of Maryland, College Park, May
2006.
1. No. 03-CVS-005617, 2007 WL 2570249 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 19, 2007) [hereinafter Cooper I].
2. Id. at *2-3.
3. Id. at *5.
4. See infra Part IlL.
5. See infra Part IV.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part IV.C.
8. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *3.
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ers or operators ... for the reasonable and necessary costs incurred in clean[ ] up
.... "' To control its reimbursement expenses, DENR set specific rates for environ-
mental services, which were published in its Reasonable Rate Document ("RRD").'0
The rates published in the RRD were derived from two sources: the typical billing
rates of environmental consultants and from bids from environmental contractors
on clean up work for un-owned property." The typical billing rates were solicited
by the state from engineers, geologists, and other environmental consultants in
reasonable rate surveys." The bids solicited for clean up on property for which no
owners are known were submitted in documents referred to as requests for propos-
als ("RFPs"). 15 Rates published in the RRD had a significant impact on marketplace
pricing. 4
A group of environmental consultants, the defendants, formed a nonprofit cor-
poration naming themselves the North Carolina Environmental Services Providers
Association ("NCESPA"). s In 2001, DENR published proposed revisions to the
RRD, setting rates that the defendants viewed as unsatisfactorily low.'6 The state
later solicited RFPs from various environmental consultants for cleanup work,
which would also have some impact on the final rates published in the RRD.Y In
response to this request, defendants allegedly took two specific actions to induce
DENR to raise the rates from those originally proposed. First, the state claimed that
NCESPA submitted reasonable rate surveys with inflated billing information." Sec-
ond, NCESPA was accused of improperly influencing prices submitted by other
contractors in RFPs.' 9
DENR and the state claimed that reasonable rate surveys2 submitted by NCESPA
members contained false billing information, intended to raise the rates published
in the RRD. Before the incorporation of NCESPA, Darin McClure, a director of the
corporation, asked the persons and entities who would be involved to complete a
reasonable rate survey.2' According to the state, McClure simultaneously engaged in
an e-mail campaign to encourage these entities to submit artificially inflated infor-
mation, despite McClure's statement that the responses "should include the true
9. Id. at *2. The source of these funds is general fees charged to tank owners. Thus, under this scheme,






15. Id. at *3. The group was formed in response to the potential changes in the RRD. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.; see also infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
19. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *3; see also infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
20. Reasonable rate surveys are consultants' statements of their charging rates, used to help the state deter-
mine the rates published in the RRD. Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *2.
21. Id. at *3.
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and reasonable rates of environmental service providers . "...-22 The targets of
McClure's request then submitted reasonable rate surveys containing inflated rates
to DENR 3 Neither the lower court nor the superior court were able to determine
"whether (1) NCESPA falsified these surveys and (2) DENR actually considered the
survey in calculating rates ... ."" However, during oral arguments, the state con-
ceded that they were aware that the rates on the surveys were false.s
DENR also claimed that NCESPA inappropriately influenced the prices submit-
ted in RFPs by sending e-mails to various environmental service providers ("ESPs")
in advance of the bidding process. 26 These e-mails warned ESPs that the recent
solicitation of bids by DENR may violate the Mini-Brooks Act,2 ' although the di-
rectors had concluded before sending the e-mail that the solicitation was not in
violation of the Act.2" The e-mails also included the "fair market rates" that
NCESPA had obtained from their manipulated reasonable rate survey,29 and en-
couraged the ESPs to "keep these points in mind," and use the NCESPA rates as a
reference when filing their RFPs3
The court granted motions to dismiss certain individual defendants based on
nonprofit officer and director immunity, dismissed the state's unfair trade and de-
ceptive practice claims, and dismissed claims for damages against certain defend-
ants." The state then filed a motion for reconsideration, prompting the court to
reinstate certain claims against certain defendants under a theory of conspiracy
against the government, noting that "conspiracy" encompasses conspiracies in re-
straint of trade.32 The state moved for summary judgment, and the court granted
the motion on the state's claim of conspiracy in restraint of trade."
22. Id.
23. Id. Scott Ryals, an employee of DENR, testified that the rates provided "'were approximately forty
percent (40%) higher than the RRD then in effect,' not including the twenty percent markup that NCESPA was
requesting be added to the rates provided." Id. at *8.
24. Id. at *3.
25. Id.
26. See id. at *3-4.
27. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-64.31 (1987). The Mini-Brooks Act restricts public works contracts from
requiring bids for certain works. Id.
28. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *8.
29. Id. at *9.
30. Id. The email also included language suggesting that the ESPs should adhere to the rates provided by
NCESPA: "If a NCESPA member firm submits anything less than what we have proposed as reasonable rates, I
think it severely undermines our position." Id.
31. State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2004 WL 2965983, at *14 (N.C. Super. Dec. 14,
2004) [hereinafter Cooper Ili.
32. State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2005 WL 3018635, at *3 (N.C. Super. Oct. 28,
2005) [hereinafter Cooper III].
33. Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at 1.
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade
Section 133-28 of the General Statute of North Carolina allows "[a]ny governmen-
tal agency entering into a contract which is or has been the subject of a conspiracy
... a right of action against the participants in the conspiracy to recover damages
".. Under North Carolina law, a conspiracy is defined as "(1) an agreement
between two or more individuals; (2) to do an unlawful act or to do an [sic] lawful
act in an unlawful way; (3) resulting in injury to [the] plaintiff inflicted by one or
more of the conspirators; and (4) [is] pursuant to a common scheme." 5 Essen-
tially, the government must demonstrate that an actual agreement to engage in
illegal activity existed, that the orchestrated effort to act was intentional, and that
the government was harmed in some way by reason of these actions.3 6
A claim for conspiracy in restraint of trade alleges that anti-competitive behavior
is the requisite unlawful activity, and is prohibited by North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 75-1." 7 "Restraint of trade" refers to any suppression of free market
competition and encompasses a wide spectrum of activity.38 The federal Sherman
Antitrust Act39 helps to guide classification of these behaviors4 and criminalizes
"[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce . . . ."' The Sherman Act was initially interpreted to
criminalize any contract that restricted trade.42 However, the Supreme Court aban-
doned this approach in Standard Oil Co. v. United States,4' recognizing that some
contracts in restraint of trade are necessary.44 In that case, the Supreme Court
found that Standard Oil, which had bought up virtually all oil refining companies
and allegedly was using its size and clout to undercut competitors, was in violation
of the Sherman Act, but the Court took care to utilize the rule of reason in its
holding.4s Standard Oil's actions were found to have exceeded the limits of the rule
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 133-28(a) (1981).
35. Privette v. Univ. of N.C., 385 S.E.2d 185, 193 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
36. Id.; see also Jones v. City of Greensboro, 277 S.E.2d 562, 571 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981).
37. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *5. Section 75-1 states that
[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or
commerce in the State of North Carolina is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person or corporation
who shall make any such contract expressly or shall knowingly be a party thereto by implication, or
who shall engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be guilty of a Class H felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (1987).
38. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
40. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521, 530 (N.C. 1973).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). This language is reflected in North Carolina General Statute section 75-1, a
prerequisite for a section 133-28 action.
42. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897), overruled by Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
43. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
44. Id. at 63-68.
45. Id. at 66-67.
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of reason because three identifiable consequences resulted: higher prices, reduced
output, and reduced quality.46 Under the current standard, the primary focus of
courts should be on the impact of the conspiracy on the competitive environment
and public policy and whether the contracts and actions "unreasonably" restrain
trade.47
B. Per Se Rules and the Rule of Reason
The Court has devised two means of determining whether an agreement or scheme
is unreasonably anticompetitive and therefore a restraint of trade: (1) per se rules
and (2) the rule of reason.4" Per se rules of antitrust are categorical prohibitions on
certain types of activities.49 For example, an agreement between competitors in an
industry to fix prices is an obvious activity in restraint of trade. ° This is horizontal
price-fixing,51 which remains in the shadow of per se illegality. 2 Once federal courts
determine horizontal price-fixing has occurred, reasonableness is not a valid de-
fense of a fixed price.53 Vertical price-fixing,54 in contrast, has been placed outside
of the reach of per se rules because it often has no detrimental effect on the free
market.55
However, North Carolina state courts have taken a slight departure from the
Supreme Court's application of per se rules, utilizing the common law rule of rea-
son even where horizontal price-fixing exists.56 This rule recognizes that a conspir-
acy to restrain trade must operate to the prejudice of the public in order to be
actionable.57 The rule of reason requires the court to consider
46. Id. at 71-76.
47. Id. at 63-65; see also Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770-72 (1990). The antitrust issue is
whether "the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets." Id. at
770.
48. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 606-08 (1972).
49. See id. at 610-12 (agreements among businesses to divide markets); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332
U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (tying arrangements); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941)
(group boycotts).
50. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223"(1940). A scheme that has the effect of
"raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity" is illegal per se. Id.
51. Collusion agreements among competitors to set prices. Horizontal price fixing remains per se anticom-
petitive because of the suppression of competition the activity necessarily entails. See id. at 220-22.
52. See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 488-89 (1950). The strict application
of illegality per se is based on the theory that price-fixing is necessarily anticompetitive and inefficient. See
Donald Dewey, Economists and Antitrust: The Circular Road, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 349, 350 (1990).
53. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927).
54. Vertical price-fixing involves agreements between parties in buyer-seller relationships within a product
chain to pre-determine a price by which to sell and purchase intermediate products. Leegin Creative Leather
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2713-15 (2007). These arrangements may exist between a manufac-
turer, distributor, supplier, or retailer. Id. at 2717-18.
55. See State Oil v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997). Vertical price fixing should instead be evaluated by the
rule of reason. Id. at 22.
56. Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521, 531 (N.C. 1973).
57. Id. at 530-31.
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facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied;. its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be
attained, are all relevant facts.5 8
This context-oriented inquiry asks whether the conduct has had an anticompeti-
tive impact on the specific industry at issue. 9 Thus, the rule makes it possible for
courts to determine that the pro-competitive benefits of restraint outweigh its anti-
competitive effects, and pass muster under restraint of trade analysis.
C. The Trend Towards Greater Application of the Rule of Reason
The definition of anti-competitive behavior under antitrust laws is very broad.6"
Courts have discretion to put the conduct out of the reach of per se rules and
analyze the action under the rule of reason. The Supreme Court expressed this
sentiment in Board of Trade v. United States,61 where it recognized that every trade
agreement restrains trade in some way, and that "[t]he true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates ... or whether it is such
as may suppress or even destroy competition."62 The Court later illustrated this in
Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,63 where it rejected application of the per
se rule to an agreement barring a retailer from selling franchised products from
locations other than those specified in the contract.64 It instead applied the rule of
reason standard and recognized that it would be undesirable to prohibit all such
restrictions. 65 The Court later expanded on this notion in Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp. ,66 where it drew a distinction between concerted action to set
prices and concerted action on non-price restrictions, 67 finding that while the for-
mer remains per se illegal, the latter is judged under the rule of reason.68 In analyz-
ing the problem of non-price restrictions, the Court adopted a high evidentiary
standard, requiring plaintiffs to "present direct or circumstantial evidence that rea-
58. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
59. See id.
60. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (defining price-fixing as setting
minimum prices); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960) (including
negotiable price lists in the definition of price-fixing).
61. 246 U.S. 231.
62. Id. at 238.
63. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
64. Id. at 49-50.
65. Id. at 57, 59.
66. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
67. An example of a non-price restriction is a requirement that a dealer sell only to customers within a
specified geographic market. Am. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTI-
TRUST HANDBOOK 501 (2007).
68. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761.
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sonably tends to prove that the manufacturer and others 'had a conscious commit-
ment to a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective." ' 9 The
legality of the conduct should be judged primarily by its market impact.7"
This trend is reflected in North Carolina's use of the rule of reason in price-
fixing cases that would traditionally be subjected to per se rules.7' The North Caro-
lina court has increasingly required demonstration of some harm to the public as a
prerequisite to finding an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.7 For example, in
Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co.,73 the court held that a scheme is unlawful only if it is
'broad enough to interfere with the interest of the public."74 Rose involved a con-
tract that established Rose's purchase price of stone from Vulcan Materials, Co., but
also fixed another, higher, minimum price at which other customers could
purchase stone.75 When Vulcan Materials departed from the terms of the contract
and charged Rose a higher price than the agreement provided, Rose brought a suit
for breach of contract.76 Vulcan Materials defended by claiming the contract was
void, arguing that it was illegal in restraint of trade, thereby releasing Vulcan from
its terms." Holding that price restriction contracts are not illegal per se, the Su-
preme Court of North Carolina upheld the terms of the contract, finding that Vul-
can Materials did not satisfy its burden of proving the contract illegal by reason of
the price discrimination it established.78 The court reaffirmed this statement in
Pearce v. American Defender Life Insurance Co.," when it required the plaintiff to
show that it relied to its detriment upon the statements made by the defendant in a
section 75-1.1 claim."0 Thus, injury to the public is a necessary ingredient to a
finding of conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Federal law provides government agencies with another means of prosecuting
behavior that does not quite fit neatly in a restraint of trade scheme. The Federal
69. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeny & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 1980)).
70. See id. at 762.
71. See, e.g., Cole v. Champion Enters., Inc., 496 F. Supp. 2d 613 (M.D.N.C. 2007) (holding that failure to
show that agreement not to compete had adverse effect on manufactured housing industry generally precludes
claim under North Carolina antitrust statute); United Roasters Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 485 F. Supp. 1041
(E.D.N.C. 1979) (applying the rule of reason to an agreement between soybean products manufacturer and
product distributor); Housing, Inc. v. Weaver, 246 S.E.2d 219 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978) (finding no illegal restraint
of trade where defendants used their possession of title to land as leverage to refuse to fulfill their contractual
obligations).
72. See, e.g., Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 343 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1986) (requiring proof of actual
injury as a result of defendant's actions); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521 (N.C. 1973) (upholding
contract that gave plaintiff a price for stone that was lower than market price).
73. 194 S.E.2d 521.
74. Id. at 531.
75. Id. at 524-26.
76. Id. at 526-27.
77. Id. at 527-28.
78. Id. at 532.
79. 343 S.E.2d 174 (N.C. 1986).
80. Id. at 181.
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
COOPER V. MCCLURE
False Claims Act"' was enacted in 1863 to combat perceived "widespread procure-
ment fraud in Civil War defense contracts."82 The federal statute prescribes a civil
penalty plus treble damages against any person who presents to the United States
Government a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval or "conspires to
defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid." 3
Courts have found that the provision encompasses a wide spectrum of activity,
including "progress reports and vouchers, false presentations of compliance with
various environmental regulations in a government contract, and redemption of
illegally obtained food stamps.'1
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In State ex rel. Cooper v. McClure,85 the court held that the facts provided sufficient
evidence of a conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation of North Carolina state
law, and that the defendants had not presented the court with evidence to rebut
this conclusion. 6 In reaching this result, the court was persuaded by the multitude
of evidence indicating NCESPA's guilt of conspiracy instead of by examination of
the actual impact on NCESPA's actions on the industry. 7
The court first concluded that a conspiracy existed among the defendants be-
cause they participated in an agreement to use the survey results to present DENR
with a set of above the market rates.88 This conspiracy was evidenced by e-mails
sent to ESPs in advance of the bidding process.8 9 Based on the content of the e-
mails, the court concluded that the intent of the message "was to unite ESPs in an
effort to present bids that were driven by the NCESPA survey," rather than by
ordinary market forces.9" In addition, the court found that the drafters of the e-
mail possessed the requisite intent to engage in conspiracy.9 Various statements
had been made by directors of NCESPA prior to delivery of the e-mail which sug-
gested that the board had decided to tread carefully to avoid collusion and antitrust
charges.92
81. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
82. John Terrence A. Rosenthal & Robert T. Alter, Clear and Convincing to Whom? The False Claims Act
and Its Burden of Proof Standard: Why the Government Needs a Big Stick, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1409, 1423
(2000) (quoting Sharon A. Jenks & Brian Kaplan, False Claims, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 555, 555 (1997)).
83. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1), (3).
84. Rosenthal & Alter, supra note 82, at 1430.
85. Cooper I, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2007 WL 2570249 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 19, 2007).
86. Id. at *7.
87. Id. at *7-14.
88. Id. at *7-8.
89. Id. at '8.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *9. Defendants "knew they were on thin ice and were aware of the shadow cast by the antitrust
laws." Id.
92. See id. For example, one director advised the board to "LET U.S. be very careful[j,]" while another
voiced concerns that "we might come off as looking like we are all in collusion by all of us (NCESPA) sending
in the same rate structure or even suggesting as much in an e-mail or worse yet the web site." Id.
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The court then found that the scheme was a restraint of trade because ESP firms
were essentially instructed which rates to submit in their RFPs.93 In reaching this
conclusion, the court was persuaded by the overwhelming evidence of industry
behavior after the broadcast of the e-mail.94 First, NCESPA's board members' com-
panies actually submitted the e-mail's rates.95 Next, NCESPA's e-mail was found to
have "clearly" influenced the rates submitted by other ESPs.96 The court decided
that these rates were guided by NCESPA rates, rather than their professional judg-
ment.97 The court determined that the defendants' actions promoted anti-competi-
tive behavior because if the members of NCESPA and other ESPs had pursued their
self-interests as they normally would have in a competitive environment, they
would have submitted lower bids in efforts to win the clean-up jobs for them-
selves.99 Finally, NCESPA's desire to discover which firms had submitted which bids
in order "to know who is 'on our team"' contributed to the court's conclusion that
the firms were not "out for themselves," one of the necessary features of an effi-
ciently functioning market.99
Lastly, the court determined that the public was injured as a result of the defend-
ants' actions.' According to the court, the injury here was the state's deprivation
of a competitive bidding process due to the artificially manufactured RRD rates.'
Although at least one DENR worker stated that the agency was aware of the allega-
tions of inflated market prices, and subsequently removed the collusive bids to
obtain their measure of "competitive market data,"'0° the court agreed with DENR's
argument that even the noncollusive bids were skewed upwards because the indus-
try was aware that competition would be blunted due to NCESPA's effort to inflate
rates. 3 The court concluded that DENR had used the allegedly "upwardly skewed
numbers to formulate the revised RRD, and was also damaged by the suppression
of competitive bidding on the RFP." 14
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the multitude of evidence demonstrates that defendants did something
wrong, the court relies upon an imperfect theory of conspiracy in restraint of trade
93. Id. at '12.
94. See infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
95. Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *11. In many submissions, the NCESPA rates were further exaggerated,
with some firms adding a 20% increase in addition to the already inflated survey results. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. For example, a director of NCESPA testified that representatives from two firms had called him to
verify whether to use the NCESPA rates or the proposed rates plus 20%. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
1oo. Id. at *15.
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to grant summary judgment, resulting in an unjustified decision.' Summary judg-
ment under this theory was unwarranted because material issues of fact still exist as
to whether defendants' actions resulted in any real injury to the plaintiffs, as re-
quired by the restraint of trade rule of reason.' 6 In so doing, the court erodes the
forward progress made in developing the rule of reason and sets precedent which
neglects to consider practicable impact.' 7 In the court's defense, a stronger theory
of prosecution may have been unavailable, and the court may have been forced to
rely upon this theory as a last resort. 0 8 Had the state of North Carolina been able to
prosecute under a theory of fraud against the government, it would have secured a
more solid ground for NCESPA's liability and left the doctrine of reasonableness
intact. 9
A. No Clear Indication of Prejudice to Public or Restraint of Trade
While there is little doubt that a conspiracy existed here, a claim for conspiracy in
restraint is comprised of two parts: (1) conspiracy"0 and (2) restraint of trade."'
Here, the question of whether NCESPA's action actually restrained trade remains
unsatisfactorily unanswered. The court should have utilized the rule of reason to
determine whether there was a negative impact on the public as a result of the
collusive efforts."' Instead, it took for granted that NCESPA's submissions actually
influenced the RRD rates and erroneously granted summary judgment."3 The
mark of anticompetitive behavior is its imposition of an adverse effect on market
competition, and by extension, on consumers." 4 Any such negative effect is absent,
or at least miniscule, in the present case.'
The impact of defendant's actions on actual service rates published by the gov-
ernment would be indirect at best. NCESPA's attempt to influence rates provided
by government was not proven to be successful." 6 DENR itself testified that it had
removed the collusive bids from their calculations because the agency had some
knowledge of the NCESPA scheme."7 The only evidence presented here demon-
105. See infra Parts IV.A.-B.
106. See infra Part IV.A.
107. See infra Part IV.B.
108. Id.
109. See infra Part IV.C.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1 (2007).
111. Id. § 75-2.
112. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Pearce v. Am. Defender Life Ins. Co., 343 S.E.2d 174, 181 (N.C. 1986); Rose v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 194 S.E.2d 521, 531 (N.C. 1973).
113. Cooper I, No. 03-CVS-005617, 2007 WL 2570249, at *16 (N.C. Super. Ct. July 19, 2007).
114. John F. Graybeal, Unfair Trade Practices, Antitrust and Consumer Welfare in North Carolina, 80 N.C. L.
REv. 1927, 1939--44 (2002) (describing different elements involved in finding an adverse effect on market
competition).
115. See infra notes 116-37 and accompanying text.
116. Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *14.
117. Id.
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strating that this attempt had any effect on the published RRD rates was conjecture
by the Director of Waste Management of DENR, based on a theory of how the
industry would act in response to NCESPA's e-mail." '8 Although decisions involv-
ing complex market forces will inevitably be based upon economic theory, here
there was room for further evidence gathering to either support or rebut DENR's
argument, which the court failed to allow."9 Moreover, even if DENR's economic
theory was proven true, the RRD rates do not actually set market prices, but merely
influence them. 2
Second, the evidence did not demonstrate that there was actual harm to the
plaintiffs or prejudice to the public, which should have precluded the grant of sum-
mary judgment under the rule of reason.'2 ' Here, "[c]ontention exist[ed] as to
whether (1) NCESPA falsified these surveys and (2) DENR actually considered the
survey in calculating rates that it would pay environmental services providers."1 22
DENR's complaint admits that the agency rejected some of the survey data and
instead used an RFP to gather lower numbers. 23 The complaint states that DENR
became aware of the defendants' behavior and excluded "at least some" of the de-
fendants' responses from consideration. 2
Moreover, the actual result of NCESPA's action, instead of harming the public,
might have gone the other way to work to the public's benefit.'25 If this occurred,
then a key component in finding restraint of trade, prejudice to the public, is miss-
ing.12' Here, the goal of the defendants' collusive action was to increase government
funding for clean-up costs, and increased government funding would probably
benefit the public because increased funding may provide for better services in the
already resource-starved arena of environmental cleanup compliance.'27 There is no
doubt that a cleaner environment increases societal wealth. 28 Although DENR
could argue that the public was injured by way of misdirection of tax dollars, this
118. Id. According to DENR, NCESPA's actions deprived the state of a free market bidding process because
the other companies would have submitted lower rates had the organization not encouraged other companies
to submit their rates. Id.
119. See supra Part III.
120. Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *2.
121. See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
122. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *3.
123. Complaint at 1 87-90, Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249 (No. 03-CVS-005617).
124. Id. at 5 136.
125. See infra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
126. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *6.
127. See, e.g., Kristin E. Reed, Comment, The EPA's Environmental Audit Policy: Are Small Businesses Disad-
vantaged?, 8 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 299, 299 (1999) (explaining the financial and administrative burdens
small businesses face in order to comply with EPA environmental standards).
128. See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Economic Benefits of Runoff Controls, http://www.
epa.gov/nps/runoff.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2008) (describing how controlling runoff can "increase the prop-
erty value and quality of life" of those living near areas with runoff problems).
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argument requires the further examination that litigation would provide. '29 Our
judicial system demands that the parties be given the opportunity to prove or dis-
prove reliance and impact, and that opportunity was denied here when the court
granted summary judgment.13
Finally, the evidence did not clearly establish that suppression of market forces,
the touchstone of a restraint of trade claim, actually occurred. 3' According to the
court, the mark of free market trade is that entities will look out for their best
interests." Here, the members of NCESPA were keeping their interests in mind
because their reports were an attempt to increase funding, allowing each company
to more effectively administer their cleanup services.'33 Since the firms would all
have received funding, none would have unfairly gained an advantage over their
competitors. 4 The ESPs would be set on equal, albeit higher ground.' 5 From
there, all principles of competitive markets would apply in the same manner.'36 Any
advantage gained by an ESP would not be the result of government funding, but
rather as its independent utilization of the additional capital, which is no different
than any other normally functioning industry.'37
Had the court allowed the case to proceed, it would have been able to more fully
ascertain whether, and to what extent, the plaintiffs and the public suffered from
NCESPA's actions. 38 For example, it could have demanded DENR to support its
contention that the RRD rates were in fact influenced by NCESPA's actions with
empirical evidence demonstrating that the rates actually experienced a significant
129. For example, NCESPA should have the chance to respond that their actions did not result in misap-
propriation of government funds, but rather reallocation, which results in no net harm because the funds are
still being utilized to benefit public interest-here, environmental cleanup.
130. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *4-5.
131. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
132. See Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *12.
133. Id. at *7. Presumably, the funds will be directed towards cleanup. Id. at *2. The more money available,
the better the cleanup job will be. Id.
134. Id. The government money would be proportionately distributed, and each company would experi-
ence a proportionate increase in funding. Id.
135. See id. for description of the North Carolina reimbursement scheme. This illustrates the need for a
more concrete theory of prosecution to protect the government against fraud. See infra Part IV.C.
136. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin
Carman ed., Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1904) (1776) for discussion of the forces of a free market economy. Full
contents and text also available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN.html.
137. See id. In a normally functioning industry, competitors combine resources and capabilities to create
distinct capabilities, which create a competitive advantage. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE:
CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE 11 (Simon & Schuster 1998) (1985). Competitive advan-
tages can take two forms: cost or differentiation advantage. Id. Cost advantage allows a market player to gener-
ate value by maximizing the number of transactions by offering products or services at a low price. Id. at 12.
Differentiation advantage, on the other hand, allows a market player to generate value by emphasizing the
quality of their products or services, resulting in fewer transactions, but a higher profit margin in each one. Id.
at 14.
138. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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increase after taking into account factors such as inflation and historical trends. 39
However, the court chose to grant summary judgment based not only on its con-
clusion that the defendants' actions were fraudulent, but also on an economic the-
ory that has yet to be proved. 4
B. The Court May Have Had No Choice but to Rely on an Imperfect Theory of
Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade, but in Doing So, Erased Forward Progress
on the Application of the Rule of Reason
Despite the existence of numerous holes in the court's theory, it is difficult to fault
the court for wanting to find some way to find the defendants liable. The defend-
ants obviously acted with ill intention. 4' However, the role of the court is not to
pass judgment based on its own perceptions of right and wrong, but to determine
who should be held responsible under the existing legal framework.'42 Here, the
court appears to have been swayed by the multitude of evidence showing the de-
fendants acting wrongly, and utilized the theory of prosecution that most closely
resembled the situation.'43 In doing so, the court backtracked on any progress made
towards broader application of the rule of reason, and created precedent that allows
courts to neglect consideration of prejudice to the public, an essential element of
restraint of trade.144
The rule of reason ideally inserted a degree of practicality into a decision of
whether an action is illegal by asking whether there was actually a deleterious effect
on the free market. 41 It offered businesses protection from being found liable for
antitrust activity when their actions had no consequences. 146 However, the court's
decision here appeared to remove that protection. 147 The result has potentially left
139. DENR could achieve this by tracking historical rates, discounting for inflation, and comparing the
most recent rates to those of the past. Any increase could then either be explained away by increases in the cost
of business, or, if the increase is too substantial, used to support DENR's allegation that the rates did in fact
increase as a result of NCESPA's RFP submissions.
140. Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *15-16. The court found that the public was injured because the state
was deprived of a competitive bidding process and because the rates were inflated, both of which would tend to
skew the numbers upward. Id. at '14. However, the court also acknowledged that these numbers were purpose-
fully adjusted downward once DENR became aware of the scheme, which would tend to negate the effects of
the conspiracy. Id. It ultimately concluded that this downward adjustment was not sufficient to offset the
inflation, but did not provide numerical evidence to support this conclusion. Id. Instead, the court simply took
10% of the value of the contracts awarded to calculate damages, less any settlement money already paid. Id. at
15-16.
141. See id. at *7-15 for the multitude of questionable activities defendants engaged in.
142. See generally Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in Democracy,
116 HARv. L. REV. 19 (2002) (discussing the role of the judiciary in society and how judges should strive to
maintain the coherence of the legal system).
143. See Cooper I, 2007 WL 2570249, at *4-5.
144. See infra notes 145-49 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 60-84 and accompanying text for development and application of the rule of reason.
146. See id.
147. This protection was removed when the court did not truly examine the detrimental effect of the
defendants' actions on the public. See Cooper 1, 2007 WL 2570249, at *14.
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businesses without the assurance of protection granted by the rule of reason, crip-
pling businesses in the possible actions they can take. 4 ' Neglecting the rule of rea-
son leaves us with decisions that will often make little practical sense, and departs
from the spirit of antitrust law.'49
C. A Proposal for North Carolina False Claims Legislation
While the court's reasoning is flawed, it is obvious that NCESPA did something
wrong and should be penalized. It is possible that the court chose to grant sum-
mary judgment due to NCESPA's blatantly fraudulent actions and the difficulty of
proving harm.' However, the court grounded its summary judgment upon a the-
ory of conspiracy and antitrust violation where material issues of fact still exist.'' A
judgment under a theory of conspiracy to engage in fraud would be less difficult to
prove and leave the decision vulnerable to far less criticism. 5 2 Therefore, this note
proposes a North Carolina False Claims Act modeled after the Federal False Claims
Act, ' 3 which would allow courts to hold parties responsible in cases like these
where harm in antitrust violations is difficult to prove."'
A North Carolina statute similar to the federal statute, which provides for an
automatic civil penalty where fraudulent actions have been uncovered, would en-
able the state government to collect damages where liability under common law or
other statutes would be difficult to ascertain. 5 Under this statutory scheme, the
burden upon the prosecution would be far less burdensome than in an antitrust
action in cases such as this one.'56 Instead of placing the burden on the state to
prove that DENR actually suffered some detriment when NCESPA submitted in-
flated rates, the state would merely have to show that NCESPA actually did submit
148. See Edmund L. Andrews & Stephen Labaton, Split Is Forming Over Regulation of Wall Street, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 23, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/23/business/23regulate.html for insight on
the suppression of business innovation that can occur in the presence of too much interference from political
or judicial powers.
149. See generally Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
49 (2007) (explaining the transition from rules to standards in antitrust law).
150. See supra Part IV.A.
151. Id.
152. See infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text.
153. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982).
154. The North Carolina False Claims Act would provide a means for the government to obtain damages
without having to prove abstract economic consequences. Several states, including Florida, California, and
Arkansas have already adopted their own form of the Federal False Claims Act. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-77-901
to 20-77-911 (Supp. 2007); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12650-12656 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 68.081-68.092
(West Supp. 2005).
155. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (1863); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748-49 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding that a qui tam plaintiff need not suffer an injury to assert a claim).
156. See generally James F. Barger, Jr., et al., States, Statutes, and Fraud: An Empirical Study of Emerging State
False Claims Acts, 80 TUL. L. REV. 465, 470-78 (2005) (discussing how the Federal False Claims Act operates).
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the false rates. 7 The burden would then fall upon NCESPA to prove that the rates
it submitted were truthful."8
A false claims statute would also provide additional bonuses. The automatic civil
penalty would serve as a deterrent for any fraudulent claims, and would provide
the government some form of relief when actual damages are less than certain. 9
Moreover, this statute may help overworked and under-funded state prosecutors
who may have less insight into the inner-workings of companies than privately
hired corporate lawyers. 6 If nothing else, the statute would provide another route
of prosecutorial theory.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the defendants undoubtedly participated in collusive and fraudulent acts,
the court grounded NCESPA's liability in conspiracy and antitrust law. 6' In doing
so, the court appears to have been persuaded by the multitude of evidence
presented by the plaintiffs, and failed to notice that material issues still existed
about the basic elements of conspiracy and restraint of trade.'62 Had the court
denied summary judgment, and allowed the plaintiffs to prove that actual harm
had been suffered, its decision would be left vulnerable to far less criticism and
grounded in more viable precedent.'63 However, the difficulty of proof, despite the
stark illegality of the defendant's actions, may have left the wrongdoers here with-
out accountability, illustrating the need for a false claims act in North Carolina to
deter procurement fraud against the government.'64 Had a false claims act been
used, the court could have avoided eroding the rule of reason, leaving more space
for intelligent and practical analysis of alleged anti-competitive behavior.'65
157. Id. at 471 n.35.
158. See generally id. at 470-78 (discussing the operation of the Federal False Claims Act).
159. Id. at 475-78.
160. Id.
161. See supra Part III.
162. See supra Part W.A.
163. See supra Part IV.B.
164. See supra Part W.C.
165. Id.
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